The failure of Ukraine’s counteroffensive: consequences

Military developments: the likely failure of the counteroffensive

In the early days of June 2023, following much anticipation, Ukraine started its counteroffensive against Russian forces in the south of the country. Its main thrusts focussed  on the Zaporizhzhia and the southern Donetsk regions.

However, despite Western and Ukrainian mainstream media presenting Kyiv’s army as a formidable force, equipped with and trained by Western specialists, and the Russian army as largely unprepared and demotivated, the Ukrainian counter-offence has all but failed to deliver strategically relevant results as of mid-September 2023.

Ukrainian troops met well-established Russian defences, comprising anti-tank ditches, trenches, artillery positions, and landmines. The latter proved particularly effective, bogging down Ukrainian forces for months. Notably, the New York Times wrote that during the first two weeks of the counteroffensive up to 20% of all Ukrainian equipment used for the advance was damaged or destroyed.

According to Hana Malyar, Ukraine’s Deputy Defence Minister, as recently as 11 September 2023, Ukraine had recaptured 305 square kilometres of land during the counteroffensive. However, one has to note that even without including territories occupied by Russia prior to the full-scale invasion started on 24 February 2022 (Crimea and parts of the Donbas), the Kremlin currently controls approximately 62,000 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory. At this pace and current capabilities, it will take Ukraine over 50 years to push Russian forces to the pre-February 2022 borders.

It is true that Ukraine will likely continue to rely on fresh and incremental supplies from the West (for instance, F16 fighter jets are expected to arrive in the early months of 2024), but there is no “magic weapon” to win the war, and supplies alone will not turn the tide in Ukraine’s favour. Additionally, increasing signs are emerging of problems in mobilising new troops. Notable is the fact that in September 2023 the Ukrainian army will start recruiting people with “limited fitness” for service, such as those with mild mental disorders, into its ranks.

Looking ahead, a breakthrough does not appear imminent or likely. In fact, before the autumn “rasputiza” (terrain turning into mud due to heavy rain) which will lower significantly the possibilities for manoeuvre warfare, Kyiv has one month left. As mentioned above, Russian fortifications on the counteroffensive axes are deep, and it took Ukraine three months to reach the initial lines of defence.

Following a slowdown in operations, a new activisation of fighting could be expected in winter, if terrain freezes but the weather is reasonably mild to allow for offensive operations. Then, the rasputiza will come again, and major fighting will likely restart in late spring/early summer 2024.

All things considered, the most likely scenario going into the summer of 2024 is a stalemate along a contact line not too dissimilar to what is currently in place in Ukraine. The second most likely outcome is for Ukrainian forces to advance moderately, 20 kilometres or so towards the city of Tokmak, without reaching Melitopol. The less likely scenario is for the Russian army to push Ukraine back to pre-counteroffensive positions. In fact, since the Battle of Bakhmut (carried out largely by Wagner forces) Russian forces have failed to take additional Ukrainian territory.

Political consequences of the counteroffensive outcomes

Following the likely failure of Ukraine’s counteroffensive, it is inevitable to see political repercussions, which will take the form of an overt or covert blame game.

On the international stage, there will be the question about whose fault was it: did the West provide not enough weapons or did the Ukrainians use the weapons inappropriately?

The Ukrainian leadership will point out that they did not receive enough modern military equipment, and when they did it was too little too late. The West, and more specifically the Pentagon and affiliated analysts, will point fingers at the inadequacy of Ukrainian tactics, and poor implementation of US military advice. Indeed, this has already started, Valery Zaluzhny, the top officer in Ukraine’s armed forces has publicly stated that his army does not have enough weapons. On the other side of the spectrum, multiple publications in the NYT and the Washington Post highlighted how US military advisors were unhappy with Ukraine’s allocation of troops as well as the tactics they adopted.

On the domestic front, there will be growing pressure on the Ukrainian political leadership, in other words, Zelensky and his team, to re-establish their credentials with renewed legitimacy. Thus, Presidential elections could take place in 2024. Notably, had Russia’s full-scale invasion not started, elections would have occurred in March 2024. However, due to the declaration of martial law in Ukraine, the poll cannot be held according to current legislation.

Besides domestic political actors demanding elections, the US has been increasingly and publicly exercising pressure on Zelensky to change the law, hold elections, and show how “Ukraine is different from Russia” in the sense that it holds free and fair elections. However, “free and fair elections” appear to be more of a slogan than a possible reality. In fact, war censorship is currently enforced in Ukraine, meaning that all media have to abide with the government line, and political rallies are largely banned. Likewise, it is unclear how the electoral process can be guaranteed for soldiers on the front lines. Lastly, Russia will likely put in place a variety of hybrid and kinetic measures to disrupt the electoral process.

Psychological: impact on the mood of the “average Ukrainian”

Considering the high expectations set forth before the start of the counteroffensive, it is reasonable to expect the “average Ukrainian” to become increasingly disillusioned following its failure.  Thus, even though the realisation that the counteroffensive has failed is likely yet to fully sink in, if one compares opinion polls in March 2023, when the setting of unreasonable expectations was underway, to surveys in August 2023, the trend is clear: increasing willingness to freeze the conflict or negotiate with Russia.

In August, this view was shared by approximately 40% of Ukrainians, a growing minority. According to the surveys, this relative minority was ready to seek an end to the conflict, without the liberation of all Ukrainian lands, in case Russia were to restart targeting cities far away from the front line with high frequency inflicting high civilian casualties.

Nevertheless, surveys show that the majority of the Ukrainian public is generally keen on continuing the war effort without making significant concessions to Russia, aiming to retake all lost territory. In fact, the majority of Ukrainians remains in favour of continuing the war until victory, which 79% believe is possible within two years.

Possible ways ahead: continue the war or start negotiations

Following the broad realisation, in Ukraine and around the world, that the counteroffensive has failed, the Ukrainian leadership will find itself in front of a very hard choice: continue the war effort amid shrinking resources, albeit with various possible degrees of intensity, or drop some of its demands to start negotiations with Russia.

Many in the West will certainly argue that the time has come for diplomacy, as Ukraine’s failure will appear to show that Kyiv cannot prevail on the battlefield. Therefore it is reasonable to negotiate with Russia, even if concessions have to be made.

It has to be considered that Kyiv has already received pledges for more than EUR 80 billion in military aid alone, which is more than half of Ukraine's GDP. Indeed, in August 2023, Stian Jenssen, director of the private office of the NATO secretary general aired during a public discussion the idea of trading Ukrainian land for NATO membership, making it clear that this was not alien to diplomats in the West. It is true that after a public outcry, he reneged on his words, but they were symptomatic of the discussions behind closed doors and showed the realm of what is being considered.

Ultimately, however, the key political event to watch is the US Presidential elections in November 2024. And while no US president would end the war immediately, a Trump victory would likely lead to a continuation of military supplies, to fulfil some of the needs of the US military-industrial complex, but diplomatically more efforts be placed on pressuring Ukraine into compromises. In fact, there would be the need to place “America First”, reducing support for international missions, but at the same time refocusing resources on the long-term US challenge: an increasingly assertive China on the international stage.

A Biden victory, which appears more likely at the moment, would not alter the current approach, and the level of support for Ukraine would probably not change. However, it is noticeable that the current Democratic administration is also increasingly placing its focus on China. In fact, as recently as August 2023, Biden has requested Congress to finance the supply of arms to Taiwan using funds included in the so-called "Ukrainian" budget.

Also, in Ukraine there is no critical mass demanding an end to the conflict, as most believe that victory, albeit loosely defined, can be achieved within two years. Therefore, no Ukrainian president, Zelensky or a possible successor, will table negotiations with Russia.

Consequences

As far as travel is concerned, airports will remain closed for the foreseeable future. In fact, considering the frequency of Russian missile and drone strikes against targets in central and Western Ukraine, no insurer would take upon itself the risks associated with air travel into Ukraine. Notably, when news started spreading about a possible reopening of the Lviv airport during the summer of 2023, Russia targeted the city with long-range strikes. Border crossings over land, by foot, car and train will remain viable options, and no large congestions are expected unless Russia critically damages Ukrainian utility supply systems during a cold winter, pushing the Ukrainians that returned to seek shelter in Europe once again.

Likewise, the threat posed by continuing land operations in the East and South of Ukraine, coupled with long-range strikes, will not create a favourable environment for renewed investments in the country. Thus, the long-awaited “reconstruction of Ukraine” will also be linked to a cessation of hostilities or a freezing of the conflict. Notably, in the case of freezing, the investment flow would be smaller than in the case of a full end of the conflict.

As far as staff is concerned, it has to be underlined that in the medium term the scarcest resource for the Ukrainian army will be people. In fact, the military commissariats are increasingly struggling to recruit new manpower into the army ranks, and as recently as mid-September the Ministry of Defence has decided to start conscripting those that up to this point were considered as having “limited fitness” for service. Indeed, now those with asymptomatic HIV, mild mental disorders or slowly progressive diseases of the central nervous system will join the army ranks. They will not necessarily be sent to the front line, likely taking care of administrative tasks, but nonetheless they will leave civilian life. Likewise, from 1 October 2023, women with medical and pharmaceutical education and experience will have to register at military commissariats for possible enlistment in the army in case the need arises.